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In the fall of 1964, not long after the Chinese had conducted their first nuclear test [October 16], John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, held a staff meeting with his deputies which I attended as his Special Assistant. In the course of the meeting he told us that the Indian Government had requested help from the US in detonating as soon as possible a nuclear device, to counter the increase in China's prestige in Asia and in the Third World. McNaughton said that Rusk supported this request, and that McNamara had agreed to join Rusk in this recommendation to the President.

McNaughton did not tell us, and I didn't hear subsequently, the precise terms of this request, exactly what sort of US "help" might have been involved, and what the channel for the request was or who made it to whom. But all subsequent discussion among McNaughton's staff presumed our common understanding that an actual request had been made, not just an exploratory discussion, and that Rusk definitely favored it. As it was put to us, the decision had been made by Rusk and McNamara to recommend to the President that he approve the Indian request.

We were not being asked for input on this issue, we were merely being informed of it. Presumably the Defense Department, and some of us, would be involved in discussions of how to meet the request. We didn't get into that in this meeting, though there was some mention that the fastest and easiest way would be for the US effectively to give them a device and conduct an explosion for them on a covert basis, presenting it to the world as an Indian achievement.

We presumed--perhaps wrongly [see the discussion in Seaborg's diary and memoir of this period]--that McNamara's predilection would have been against such aid, on proliferation grounds, but we got the impression from McNaughton that McNamara had deferred to Rusk and the State Department on this.

Most of us questioned the wisdom of this. We asked why Rusk took the position he did. McNaughton told us that Rusk's attitude was: "If our enemies have the bomb, why shouldn't our friends have it?" (These were McNaughton's exact words--I remember clearly--in describing Rusk's "position." I don't know if he heard them directly from Rusk in any meeting: probably not. My impression at the time was that he had been briefed on this discussion by McNamara, and that he was relaying to us McNamara's account to him).

We could think of some obvious answers to Rusk's question, and someone brought up two of them: Japan, and Germany. If India (far from one of our closest "friends") could explode a device, wouldn't Japan feel compelled to demonstrate the same capability, for

similar reasons? And if Japan did so, nine years after World War II, wouldn't Germany want to do the same?

McNaughton said that both of these points had come up in the discussion with the State Department, and that Rusk's reaction was: "Well, why not?" The same principle was involved: "If our enemies--now China as well as the Soviet Union--have it, why not our friends?"

We didn't agree that this was an unanswerable question, but we also knew--from McNaughton--that McNamara didn't like to reconsider a question once he had arrived at a position, and that McNaughton was extremely loath to ask him to do it. Nevertheless, we all felt uneasy about what we saw as a bad shift in policy and a dangerous precedent, as we discovered when we talked among ourselves after that meeting.

Finally, within a day or so, we did something that we had never done before or did again. We asked our boss for another meeting, and we presented to him our joint opinion that he should, on this occasion, reopen the issue with McNamara and urge him to reopen discussion with Rusk and reconsider the decision. We argued that we weren't convinced that Rusk or State had given enough consideration to the possible negative consequences of this decision, and that the issue was too serious to accept it as settled already without more analysis and debate.

McNaughton didn't have to remind us of his reluctance to reopen a question like this with McNamara; he knew we all knew that. For that very reason he was impressed by the concern we evidenced by our initiative with him and our solid front, as well as by our substantive arguments. As was his nature, he rehearsed aloud how he could put it to McNamara: "I have a brilliant team of deputies, and on this one occasion they all felt so strongly that they felt they had to urge me to come back to you and ask you to reopen this with Rusk...I have to take their arguments seriously..." He told us he would do it.

Soon after he told us that he had raised it with McNamara who had agreed to reopen the question with Rusk. (In my year as Special Assistant, this was one of only two or three cases where he told me that a suggestion that I had specifically pressed had been approved by McNamara. Incidentally, this was really a joint position of the deputies and me; I don't recall feeling any more strongly about it than they did or playing a special role. Alvin Friedman, for example, who had been my predecessor as Special Assistant and who was now Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans and Policy, felt very strongly, and I remember him being very articulate in the second meeting with McNaughton),

I was told that the recommendation on the Indian request had been put on hold and that there would be further discussion. Later, I heard of the existence of the Gilpatric Committee which was addressing the whole issue of US policy on proliferation. It

was my impression at the time, which may or may not have had any valid basis, that the formation of this committee was a response to our initiative, as presented by McNamara to Rusk (presumably as his own). But that impression was simply based on the timing and on my being told that the conclusions of the Gilpatric Committee would settle this issue. I didn't read the Report at the time in 1965-- my first knowledge of its detailed recommendations was in the Seaborg memoir which I read about 1992, after which I got hold of the declassified version of the Report.

I did hear in the spring of 1965 that the Gilpatric Committee had come down essentially on our side, in opposing any US support to any proliferation, even among friends, but that the President had basically shelved its specific recommendations.

Seaborg's account is crucial for an understanding of the positions of Rusk, and perhaps McNamara, at that time. His description of Rusk's attitude is entirely consistent from we heard from McNaughton at the time. However, Seaborg says nothing about a definite request from India for help, then or later, nor a tentative decision by Rusk on it. On that point this recollection supplements the Seaborg discussion.

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MEMcon with George Perkovich on India and CTB..

The debate in India started to shift after the NPT Extension, which they didn't expect (?). They saw a CTB coming, which would prevent their ever getting a credible nuclear posture--vs. China--for them.

Their choice was either to accept a new international norm [which would not really be adhered to by the NWS, so it would be a norm in which a two-tiered system was embedded, a norm of two classes of states, with India in the "wrong" tier: permanent subordination, like colonial status: this was the perception of which I warned last year] or to keep their nuclear option open or actually move to a nuclear state status.

Last December the preparations reported by Tim Weiner and R. Jeffrey Smith were real: they were about to test. (GP didn't make this clear in the World Policy article. India first denied this, then called it "totally speculative").

Then again, when the Janata Bharatiya (sp?) party was briefly in power for 11 days after the April-May 1996 election, they were very close to announcing a decision to test.

There is now "a very real danger" that they will test. That is what is driving their position at the Conference on Disarmament, not merely symbolic or tactical considerations. They don't want a test ban that will prevent them from doing what they intend or want to do: test, and perhaps deploy. Nor do they want to be singled out as the one nation that has prevented Entry Into Force. Thus they have objected [as did US, and CRND!] to CD treaty provision that requires their signature for EIF. And with that in, they not only won't sign; they won't let treaty be offered for signature.

Thus, when they test, they will not be defying an actual treaty signed and ratified by many nations; there will be no treaty.

They could say, "we'll do 3-5 tests, then sign the CTB" [like France and China]. Pakistan would test if the Indians do, but they could do the same.

If neither actually deployed weapons then (merely keeping the option, of unweaponized deterrence: but now with the capability of smaller, missile-capable warheads, perhaps thermonuclear (!) GP sees this as "the best possible outcome" (i.e., better than one in which neither India nor Pakistan would sign at all. Still, is it clear that their signing after several tests is better than their

not-signing but not having tested? Well, it is if it continued to be true that the treaty would not EIF unless they had signed.)

However, what is more likely is that if they tested, the momentum would build and be overpowering to deploy new weapons. [They might then be ready to enter the NPT: as nuclear states! But what would this say to countries like Iran and Egypt; or Indonesia, Nigeria...why should they accept the permanent status of NNWS?]

GP: India can't get a credible invulnerable deterrent capability against China in less than a couple of decades. Meanwhile, they would be building vulnerable forces, with weak and vulnerable command and control. The same would be true for Pakistan. Thus the worst possible situation would emerge, of instability: two countries (aside from China) in a state of war, with realistic concern in a crisis for possible preemptive attack by the other and incentives to preempt themselves. The "delicate balance of terror" (the Pallid Giant). (This has never really existed, between the US and SU, since the SU relied on a non-existent bluff "force" in 1959-62 rather than a large vulnerable force of SS-6's. So the Berlin and Cuban crises didn't really test the stability of such a situation).

Yet very few ("perhaps a dozen") in the sub-continent seem to be aware of or concerned about this prospect.

General Sundarji, the former Army Chief of Staff, a very genial, funny, likeable person, speaks lightly about the need for a "minimum force of 135 warheads," and dismisses the need for more command and control or early warning systems. They will find their own solutions to the situation, avoid the dangers the US and SU fell into...not specified how.

Sundarji in 1986-87 ran exercises in which huge Indian forces made a mock run at the Pakistan border.

GP: The likelihood is very low of a CTB signed this year. Clinto could in principle, e.g., press allies to drop the clause requiring Indian signature for EIF, so that India would not block signing. "But Bob Bell opposes doing that." (He agrees with my long-time assessment that Bob Bell has never given up his opposition to a CTB.)

Krepon and the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Danger has been lobbying against the provision giving the Indians a veto on EIF for the last several months. (It could be foreseen that the Indians wouldn't sign and couldn't be budged, although GP and others did not foresee that they would be so bold as to refuse to let the Treaty be signed at all).

4-5 weeks ago Tony Lake called Krepon and asked him to "back off, we've done all we could on this", but Krepon didn't back off.

Still, if Clinton is reelected, there is "a 55-45 chance of a CTB in 1997." (That's much higher than the assessment, a year or six months ago, of the odds on getting a CTB in 1997 or later if we didn't get it signed this year).

However, with MacDougal cooperating with the prosecutors (announced today) there is a chance of an indictment of Clinton before the election: which would mean Dole for President, with a Republican platform opposing a CTB.